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ABSTRACT 
The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, 
where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. 
The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue 
position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an 
archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment 
should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series 
cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic 
policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, 
left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under 
their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that 
might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue. 
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Virtually all economic voting studies, and there are hundreds, examine a variant of the classic 
reward-punishment hypothesis. (See the reviews in Duch (2007); Hellwig (2010); Norpoth 
(1996); Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000; 2007)). That is, voters are assumed to vote with the 
government when economic times are good, but vote against the government when economic 
times are bad. In his seminal work, Kiewiet (1983, 7-8) labelled this sort of economic voting as 
incumbency-oriented. However, he distinguished another kind of economic voting as policy-
oriented. That is, voters are assumed to vote for the party closest to their economic policy 
position, regardless of whether it governs. Kiewiet (1983,13) goes on to note that studies of 
policy-oriented economic voting were rare. Writing over 25 years later, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 
(2011, 288-290), in their literature review, observe that policy-oriented economic voting studies 
remain rare. They clarify, as well, that the incumbency-oriented hypothesis sees the economy as a 
valence issue, whereas the policy-oriented hypothesis sees the economy as a positional issue.  
Valence connotes an issue where voters are in wide agreement, while position connotes 
an issue where voter are in wide disagreement. Pure policy-oriented economic voters, then, select 
a party closer to their issue position, regardless of its incumbency status. Further, policy-oriented 
economic voters may continue to select that same party, election after election, if that party 
appears to “own” the issue (Petrocik 1996). Such issue voters become the “clientele” of the party, 
continually favoring it at the ballot box, according to Rattinger (1991). As an empirical example, 
he records the link in Germany between the unemployment issue and vote for the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD). This early study is suggestive for the present investigation, as shall be 
seen.  
We examine the impact of economic policy-oriented voters in Western European national 
elections, focusing on the unemployment question.   While unemployment has of course been 
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subject to other electoral research, that work has typically been in the context of unemployment 
as a classic valence issue, or as a trade-off issue vis-à-vis inflation.  [The earliest efforts there are 
on the British case.  See Butler and Stokes (1969) and Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970).]  However, 
the notion that unemployment stands as a positional issue along a left-right scale, in the 
Downsian sense, has been virtually absent from the traditional economic voting literature 
(Downs, 1957).  Here we expand this limited literature, bringing to it this positional perspective 
on unemployment.  Specifically, we explore the connection between changes in the 
unemployment rate and left party voting, utilizing a large time-series cross-sectional pool. Below, 
we examine further the available literature, and formulate testable hypotheses. Then, we present 
our data and measures. After explicating our statistical methods, we show the results, and 
challenge them to different robustness checks. The policy issue of unemployment works to shape 
vote choice in these advanced democracies. However, perhaps unexpectedly, incumbency-
oriented voting intrudes to condition this policy-oriented vote. 
THEORY AND LITERATURE 
As Stokes (1963) long ago observed, the economy offers the perfect example of a valence 
issue. Among voters, consensus prevails, as everyone wants economic prosperity. While this 
clearly stands as a paramount idea, taken alone it limits the potential space of economic issues. In 
particular, it does not take into account differing voter positions on economic policy. As Stokes 
(1963, 373) himself explained, “Let us call ‘position issues’ those that involve advocacy of 
government actions from a set of alternatives over which a distribution of voter preferences is 
defined.” With respect to the economy, these position issues could include questions such as 
unemployment, regulation, taxation, or nationalization.  
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For example, voter opinion might be distributed along a continuum with respect to 
taxation, where those at one extreme favor a highly progressive system, while those at the other 
extreme do not. The political question, then, is whether these different economic policy positions 
influence vote choice. We know, in fact, that policy views on tax progressivity have shaped the 
vote in at least two electorates – the United States and the United Kingdom. Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau (2009) found that the more voters favored progressive taxation, the more likely they were 
to vote for Obama in the 2008 presidential election. In an investigation of the 2010 British 
general election, Lewis-Beck et al. (forthcoming) discovered that voters favoring tax 
progressivity were more likely to support Labour. Moreover, these effects persisted in the face of 
stringent statistical controls. The implication is that positional economic voting has an impact, 
independent of valence economic voting. 
 
What about the positional issue at hand, that of unemployment policy? Kiewiet (1983, 8) 
treats voting on the unemployment issue as the archetypal example of policy-oriented economic 
voting. Using the United States case, he identifies voters who always vote Democratic, regardless 
of the president’s party, because they believe that Democrats are more likely to deliver on their 
policy preference for lower unemployment. In a Western European context, this argument 
underpins Rattinger’s (1991) finding that the SPD generally benefits from rising unemployment; 
German voters tend to feel that that leftist party will be more likely to solve the problem. A 
contemporary work, from Spain, suggests that increasing unemployment helps Socialists at the 
ballot box, even when they are incumbent (Magalhães et al. 2012). In their investigation of 
Hungarian legislative elections, Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck (2009) also show that the Socialists, 
in office or not, always reap votes from rising unemployment. However, Dassonneville and 
Hooghe (2012) find that in Belgium a Socialist Party incumbent is actually punished for rising 
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unemployment. The results of Pacek and Radcliff (1999) point in the same direction, with respect 
to leftist parties in Scandinavia. By way of contrast, Arnesen (2012) concludes that the 
relationship in Norway is conditional, with the left gaining votes from increasing unemployment 
when in opposition, but losing votes when in government. 
 
Together, the foregoing studies suggest that unemployment change can influence the left 
vote. However, the studies vary by country and by time period. Further, they are inconclusive 
with respect to the form of the relationship takes, e.g., is positive, negative, or interactive? In 
answer, we propose to look at a large number of countries, over a long time period. First, taking 
inspiration from Kiewiet’s theoretical proposition linking unemployment to the vote, we offer for 
testing the following hypothesis:  
          H1: As the unemployment rate worsens, the left vote share increases. 
 As stated, H1 posits a general monotonic relationship between unemployment rate change 
and left vote. However, some of the above empirical case studies imply that incumbency itself 
may condition the relationship (Arnesen 2012; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2012; Magalhães et al. 
2012; Pacek and Radcliff 1999). In particular, it appears that when the Socialists are in office, 
they may benefit less electorally from worsening unemployment. Therefore, we offer a follow-up 
hypothesis: 
          H2: As the unemployment rate worsens, the left vote share increases less, under a left 
incumbent.  
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DATA AND MEASURES 
When investigating the electoral success of left parties, the definition of a left party needs 
to be clear. We use the classification of party families provided in the ParlGov dataset (Döring 
and Manow 2011). Their dataset distinguishes basic party categories, including Christian 
democratic, Communist/socialist, Conservative, Green/Ecologist, Liberal, Regional, Right-wing, 
Social democratic and Special issue parties.1 For the calculation of the left vote share, we 
summed the electoral results of Communist/socialist and Social democratic parties.2 Doing so, we 
focus on the traditional left vote. Data on electoral results (for legislative elections only) also 
come from the ParlGov database. We focus on established Western European democracies, with 
parties and voters accustomed to participating in legislative elections. As the histogram of Figure 
1 shows, there is good variation in the dependent variable of left vote share, and the distribution 
approaches normality. (To allow for dynamic modeling, a lagged dependent variable is included 
in the data-set as well: the summed vote share of left parties in the previous legislative elections). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
We are interested in the impact of economic policy voting on left parties. As an economic 
indicator to capture this effect, we make use of the change in the unemployment rate. 
(Measurement experiments, looking at the unemployment rate as a level rather than a change 
score, demonstated that the level measure did not significantly influence the left vote share. 
Results available upon request).   For calculating changes in unemployment rates in the countries 
analyzed, we make use of yearly unemployment rates as provided in the World Economic 
                                                                 
1 Not all parties in their dataset have received a party family label; some are categorized as ‘no family’, others still 
have to be coded. Furthermore, electoral alliances between parties from different party families are coded as 
‘electoral alliances’. Only parties that received more than 1% of the votes were included in the ‘Left parties’ vote 
share’. 
2 For an overview of which parties are included and the categories these parties are in, see the Appendix. 
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Outlook Database of the IMF (World Economic Outlook Database 2012). Changes in 
unemployment over the legislative cycle, i.e., from the year beginning the term to the year before 
the election at time t, are calculated. Doing so, we include the trend in unemployment rates as 
observed by t-1 in the analyses, thereby ensuring some lead time.  Data on unemployment rates 
are available from the early 1980s onwards.  (Interestingly, across the period this change in 
unemployment rate variable ranges from -6.44 to 10.00, with a standard deviation = 2.39. 
Further, that distributional pattern hardly varies under left incumbent versus non-left incumbent 
governments, i.e., standard deviation = 2.19 and 2.67, respectively.)  Elections in Western Europe 
from 1982 to 2012 are taken into account, yielding a data-set of 149 elections from 21 countries.3 
The elections and countries included are listed in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Since the mechanisms of left voting may depend on whether leftist parties are part of the 
ruling coalition, we include a measure of incumbency. Of course, a dummy variable scored 1 if a 
leftist party is in the governing coalition and 0 if no leftist parties are in the coalition, is one 
possibility.  But another, more telling measure, is the percentage of incumbent seats in parliament 
that are held by members of a left party; thus, we use this measure, labelling it left incumbency 
share.  
Additionally, some elements of the political context are taken into account. First, the 
effective number of parties is controlled for, since the electoral success of leftist parties may be 
affected by the number of parties competing in elections. Data on the effective number of parties 
(ENEP) in the elections analyzed come from Gallagher’s (2012) database on electoral systems. 
                                                                 
3 For Germany, data on West Germany are included before unification and data on Germany as a whole afterwards. 
These are considered different countries. 
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(Experiments were carried to determine if main results were altered if ENEP was excluded, 
and/or the least squares index of party disproportionality were included.  The disproportionality 
measure failed to demonstrate significance.  Further, if ENEP is excluded, the pivotal result, as 
reported in Table 3, Model III, maintains itself virtually intact.  Results available upon request).  
Second, turnout in the elections analyzed is controlled for, since the vote share of left parties may 
be higher when turnout is higher (Pacek and Radcliff 1995). Data for turnout in the elections 
analyzed come from the IDEA on-line database (Voter Turnout. International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) data 2012). Third, a variable measuring time 
between elections is controlled for, on the notion that there might be significant erosion of left 
support, as temporal distance from the last contest increases.  The maximum score on this 
variable is five years, while the minimum is one year; the average is 3.66 years.  Descriptive 
statistics on this and for the other variables mentioned are provided in Table 2. For both turnout 
and ENEP, lagged effects as well are included in the dynamic models, referring to turnout and 
ENEP in previous elections in the countries analyzed. 
[Table 2 about here] 
METHODS 
The data analyzed are time series cross sectional (TSCS) data, with multiple elections 
observed for all countries. Different approaches can be taken for analysing such data (Bell and 
Jones 2012). Given that our interest concerns the causal effect of unemployment on left party 
voting regardless of contextual differences, we begin with a fixed effects approach. Thus, the 
variance at the country level is controlled for by means of country dummies, leaving just the 
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within-country effects to be estimated (Allison 2009; Bell and Jones 2012). However, to provide 
robustness checks, we go on to include other approaches as well. 
 
INITIAL RESULTS 
As a first step, we investigate the effect of unemployment rate change on left party vote 
share, without controlling for the lagged dependent variable. Results of Model I in Table 3 
indicate a noteworthy unemployment rate effect.   The coefficient, significant and in the expected 
direction, suggests that when the unemployment rate rises 1 percentage point, traditional leftist 
parties gain .41 of a percentage point in vote share. Hence our first hypothesis, H1, receives 
preliminary support. What about influence from the control variables? On the one hand, turnout 
does not seem to significantly affect the electoral success of left parties, contrary to earlier 
findings of Pacek and Radcliff (1995). The effective number of parties, on the other hand, quite 
logically has a strong and significant impact. Leftist parties obtain fewer voters as the number of 
parties in an electoral system increases. With respect to the other control variables, no significant 
effects appear.  That is, no net incumbency effect emerges, i.e., leftist parties do not attain a 
significantly larger vote share as left parties gain majority seats in parliament.  Finally, while the 
distance from the last election carries the expected (negative) sign, it falls short of significance.  
Apparently, no “disillusionment” of the left occurs with this passing of time.     
Model II goes on to include a lagged dependent variable, so reducing omitted variable 
bias. This vote share of leftist parties at t-1 is actually a strong control, making causality claims 
more convincing. Clearly, changes in the unemployment rate are still significantly related to left 
party vote share, with the effect at least as strong, when compared to the static model. 
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(Furthermore, the significant negative effect of more parties in an electoral system holds).  Lastly, 
the model fit shows a substantial boost, with the addition of this lagged term. 
Model III adds an interaction effect between changes in unemployment rate and the 
incumbency dummy. Doing so allows us a first test of H2, the hypothesis that left parties benefit 
less from rising unemployment rates when a left party is in government. This hypothesis receives 
support. The main effect of an increasing unemployment rate remains significantly positive for 
the left. However, the interaction effect shows that, for a left incumbent, that effect diminishes 
considerably. Indeed, the interaction effect more than cancels out the main effect (.97 – 1.46 =     
- .49), turning electoral benefits to the left into electoral costs.  
[Table 3 about here] 
These effects are graphically presented in Figure 2. Initially, growing unemployment rates 
increase the vote share of leftist parties, if these are all in opposition. Further, decreasing 
unemployment rates are associated with a significantly smaller left vote share, if all left parties 
are in opposition (see Figure 2a).  However, as the left incumbency share increases, the positive 
effect on the left vote share begins to decline (compare Figure 2a to Figure 2b).  By the time the 
left incumbency share reaches 100 percent, the  trend of  left vote impact of rising unemployment 
is highly negative (see Figure 2c). Taking the confidence bands into account, the left only makes 
gains in this graph at higher ends of decreasing unemployment, and that effect appears quite 
small.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
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FIRST ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The estimates of Table 3 support the hypothesis that economic policy-oriented voting may 
exist. In the face of a worsening unemployment rate, voters may turn leftward. However, this 
benefit to the left appears blunted, even reversed, as left assumes as larger role in government 
(see Model III). Thus, the left in office cannot depend on winning more support if unemployment 
rises, despite the fact that it might be pereived by some to “own” that issue. If such a proposition 
rings true, the finding certainly has implications for left policy strategy in government. Because 
of these implications, some caution is in order. Therefore, we perform additional analyses (on the 
specification of Model III, Table 3) in order to ascertain the robustness of these findings: a 
general random effects maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), a within-between random effects 
MLE, and a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation.  These new estimates appear in 
Table 4.   
[Table 4 about here].  
Model I of Table 4 presents the results of a standard random effects specification. Instead 
of including dummies for capturing the country effects, a nested structure of elections within 
countries is specified. As can be observed, results are robust to this modeling approach. The main 
effect of unemployment on the vote share of left parties is still positive and significant, while the 
interaction with the incumbency dummy holds its sign and significance level as well. 
Substantively, this Model I says about the same thing as Model III in Table 3: on net, a left 
incumbent loses from a rising unemployment rate (.93 – 1.37 = - .44).  Model II additionally 
includes the means of all independent variables, thus capturing heterogeneity and transforming 
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the model into a witin-between random effects model.  This more elaborate specification sustains 
the Model I results regarding unemployment effects. Indeed, the precise estimate of net effects is 
almost the same:  (.97 – 1.46 = -.49).    
The above multi-level models (I and II in Table 4) indicate that the unemployment rate 
change does not vary significantly across countries, thereby providing further support for the 
fixed effects results of Table 4.  One caution with these corraborative multi-level model findings 
concerns their limited sample base of 21 countries.  However, the fixed effects results receive 
approach from yet another approach, that of a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) model, 
appearing in Model III, Table 4.  Such estimation has further value, too, because of the over-time 
nature of the data-set.  Clearly, these results support the initial fixed effect results (of Table 3, 
Model III), yielding almost the same negative net effect of the changing unemployment rate ( .90 
– 1.31 = -.41).   An additional insight gleaned from the PCSE approach is the strength of overall 
model fit, with an R-squared = .71.    
SECOND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Estimation using the various approaches of Table 4 suggest the soundness of the initial 
fixed effects result – under a left incumbency the impact of rising unemployment on left vote 
becomes unambiguously negative.  Nevertheless, the finding may still be threatened by 
autocorrelation.  Therefore, in further testing, we examine three difference designs.  We begin 
with a simple first differenced design, removing country level differences and autocorrelation at 
once.  In this highly controlled specification, we regress (via ordinary least squares) change in 
unemployment rate on change in left vote share (reporting cluster-robust standard errors).  Again 
we observe the earlier result:  the estimated negative unemployment effect overwhelms the 
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positive unemployment effect, under the condition of left incumbency. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the effect appears at least as strong ( 1.04 – 1.60 = - .54). 
[Table 5 about here] 
 Besides autocorrelation, there can be concerns regarding the endogeneity of explanatory 
variables (Roodman 2009). Building on the work of Anderson and Hsiao (1982), who proposed 
to eliminate correlated errors in a dynamic specification by means of first differencing, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) have suggested a GMM estimator that additionally makes use of a set of lagged 
variables as instruments. Although the GMM differences estimator of Arellano and Bond clearly 
has some advantages, it also has been found to suffer from a large finite sample bias, with 
estimates of this method regularly found to be imprecise (Blundell and Bond 1998). Therefore, 
elaborating on the GMM differences estimator, Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), suggest including additional moment conditions in levels in the estimations. Given 
the added value of GMM estimators for dynamic modeling, plus their popularity within the 
research literature (Roodman 2009) for validating robustness, we will present an Arellano-Bond 
differences GMM estimation and an additional levels specification, also called system-GMM 
(Blundell and Bond 1998). See Models II and III, respectively, in Table 5. 
These GMM estimation approaches are particularly suited for data having many panels 
but few time periods, such as we have (with more countries than time periods for each country). 
The estimations, however, come with additional assumptions. First, there should be no second-
order serial correlation. Second, instruments are only valid if they are not correlated with the 
errors of the first-differenced equation. (We test for violations of these assumptions by means of 
an Arellano-Bond and a Sargan-test, respectively.) These estimations permit inclusion of time 
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effects; consequently the GMM models include election dummies (coefficients not reported). 
Theit estimations are based on the use of lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments, 
with two lags as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Further, lagged values of the 
independent variables can be used. Given that previous values on some of our independent 
variables (i.e. turnout and the effective number of parties) can be expected to have an impact on 
current values, the estimations also include two lags of these independent variables. 
The GMM estimations (Models II and III, Table 5) again show that the  direction and 
significance levels of the unemployment variable, and its interaction variable with the left 
incumbency share variable, are  stable in Models II and III (when compared to the fixed effects 
Model III in Table 3). The size of the interactive effect however, is clearly much stronger than the 
main effect of unemployment. In fact, here the main effect and the interaction effect are very far 
from cancelling out. Instead, their combination (1.18 - 2.10 =-.92, and 1.34 – 2.14=-.80, 
respectively) suggest a still stronger net negative impact of rising unemployment on left vote, to 
the degree that left parties govern.   
This very strong GMM result may be taken with a grain of salt, given that the method 
requires looking at somewhat fewer elections, with many instrumental variables.  Nevertheless, it 
does confirm the robustness of the initial, straightfoward, fixed effects finding:  when the left 
governs, rising unemployment costs that government votes. When a left coalition governs, then, it 
will be punished for rising unemployment. It cannot escape the blame for bad economic policy, 
even if it “owns” the unemployment issue. Indeed, the electorate appears to hold it accountable to 
this “ownership”, punishing it for failure to fulfill its promise.   
THE LEFT ELECTORAL STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS UNEMPLOYMENT 
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 The left vote share in these Western European nations responds to the unemployment 
picture.  In particular, changes in the unemployment rate clearly reduce the left vote under a left 
incumbency.  This circumstance raises a strategic question for left governments:  what should 
they do when they face a rising unemployment rate?  If they do nothing, they almost certainly 
will lose votes.  So what if they make program changes, or initiate counter-cyclical policies, 
aimed at cushioning the unemployment shock, in that way perhaps saving votes for the left.  We 
have evidence on two such strategies, one general and one specific.  For the former, we 
distinguish between different types of welfare regimes.  Ferrera (1996) offers the following 
Western European typology:  Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian, Scandinavian, and Southern.  
Using this typology, we assign each country in the sample, creating a time-invariant 
variable situated at the country-level.  Then, we explore a hierarchical linear model to investigate 
the effect of welfare system on left party vote share, adding these variables as main and 
interactive effects to our general multi-level model (Table 4, Model I).  As expected, countries 
under certain welfare regimes, as a block, vote significantly more left in general, namely the 
Southhern wlfare regimes (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Malta).  However, with 
respect to the cross-level interactions with the unemployment rate change variable, none are 
significant.  Thus, welfare regime differences do not appear to alter the effect of unemployment 
rate change, with respect to the left vote.  Rising unemployment, then, will hurt a left government 
just as much, regardless of the type of national welfare system it adminis ters. 
 However, perhaps this finding on welfare regime type fails to be fine-grained enough to 
pick up policy differences.  Therefore, we carried out analysis on a more direct measure- national 
public spending on unemployment policies (measured as a percentage of GDP according to 
OECD data).  We include this variable as a main effect, and as an interaction effect with the 
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unemployment rate change, in our baseline fixed effects model (Table 3, Model III).   Because of 
missing data, the sample is reduced (121 elections, in 19 countries).  The interaction term 
between spending on unemployment policies and change in unemployment rates attains marginal 
significance, also hinting at a collinearity problem (t = -.39/.19 = 2.05).  This result, though 
fragile, does suggest that left government spending on the negative consequences of rising 
unemployment can mitigate the vote losses they will suffer from this unemployment.  Further, 
although these are macro-data, it does imply that unemployed individuals themselves can make 
some difference.  However, in terms of strategies of the left in power, even this weak result sends 
a message:  if it wishes to curb vote loses in the face of increasing unemployment, it should 
consider implementation of programs targeted at those most directly harmed by that 
unemployment.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The policy-oriented hypothesis of economic voting receives naïve support, according to 
our initial analysis of this Western European pool. In general, an increase in the unemployment 
rate appears to lead voters to reward left parties. In particular, a percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with just under a one-half percentage point rise in support for 
left parties. Thus, positional issues on the economy, as well as valence issues, can matter to 
voters.  However, the presence of positional economic voting, as discerned here, remains far from 
a negation of incumbency-oriented voting.  
We observe that, when left parties are in office, the left receives much less electoral 
benefit from rising unemployment. In fact, voters seem to hold the ruling left responsible, to 
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considerable degree, for the deteriorating unemployment rate. At least a faction of them punish 
the left by withdrawing their support. Overall, the punishment is severe enough that it largely 
cancels out any long-term benefit coming from left “ownership” of the unemployment issue. 
According to our central finding, a finding sustained under tough statistical testing, the left in 
government clearly loses votes from hikes in the unemployment rate. They may own the issue, 
but since they are not displaying “pride of ownership” in the face of growing ununemployment 
under their leadership, they lose support.  
Thus, they are judged as incumbents, failing in their responsibility to deliver good 
economic policy, and thereby held accountable at the ballot box. In this way, incumbency-
oriented economic voting continues to operate, even in the face of policy-oriented economic 
voting undercurrents pulling in the opposite direction.  Ultimately, the left parties appear not that 
special when it comes to unemployment issues.  When they are in government, a decreasing 
unemployment rate benefits them, while an increasing unemployment rates costs them.  Under 
this condition, unemployment operates as a valence issue, with incumbency-oriented economic 
voting trumping policy-oriented economic voting. 
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TABLE 1. Elections included in the analysis  
Country Time frame # 
elections 
% 
Austria 1986-2008 8 5.37 
Belgium 1985-2010 8 5.37 
Cyprus 2001-2011 3 2.01 
Denmark  1984-2011 10 6.71 
Finland 1987-2011 7 4.70 
France 1986-2012 7 4.70 
Germany 1994-2009 5 3.36 
Greece 1985-2012 10 6.71 
Iceland 1987-2009 7 4.70 
Ireland 1982-2011 8 5.37 
Italy 1987-2008 7 4.70 
Luxembourg 1989-2009 5 3.36 
Malta 1992-2008 5 3.36 
The Netherlands 1982-2012 10 6.71 
Norway 1985-2009 7 4.70 
Portugal 1983-2011 10 6.71 
Spain 1986-2011 8 5.37 
Sweden 1985-2010 8 5.37 
Switzerland 1987-2011 7 4.70 
United Kingdom 1987-2010 6 4.03 
West Germany 1983-1990 3 2.01 
Total  149 100.00 
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Traditional left vote share 149 38.08 10.41 10.20 58.90 
Traditional left vote share (E-1) 149 38.90 10.86 10.20 59.00 
Δ Unemployment rate (legislative 
cycle) 
149 0.25 2.39 -6.44 10.00 
Left incumbency share 149 0.41 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Time between elections 149 3.66 1.02 1.00 5.00 
ENEP 149 4.66 1.70 2.02 10.28 
Turnout 149 77.45 11.78 42.30 98.20 
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TABLE 3. Fixed effects regression of left voting, unemployment and incumbency effects 
 Model I 
Static FE 
Model II 
Auto-regressive 
FE 
Model III 
Interaction FE  
Constant 58.65*** 
(10.21) 
56.58*** 
(10.63) 
56.16*** 
(10.43) 
Traditional left vote (E-1)  0.06 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
Δ Unemployment rate (legislative 
cycle) 
0.41* 
(0.19) 
0.42* 
(0.19) 
0.97*** 
(0.25) 
ENEP -2.01** 
(0.58) 
-1.97** 
(0.58) 
-1.53** 
(0.58) 
Turnout -0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.18 
(0.11) 
Time between elections -0.03 
(0.50) 
-0.10 
(0.51) 
-0.14 
(0.49) 
Left incumbency share 1.13 
(1.24) 
0.76 
(1.39) 
0.79 
(1.33) 
Left incumbency share* Δ 
Unemployment rate 
  -1.46** 
(0.45) 
N countries 21 21 21 
N elections 149 149 149 
R² within 0.11 0.11 0.18 
R² between 0.09 0.18 0.14 
R² overall 0.10 0.17 0.17 
Rho 0.73 0.71 0.73 
Estimates of a fixed effects regression in Stata. Significance levels * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001 (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 4. Random effects and panel regressions of left voting, unemployment and 
incumbency effects 
 Model I 
RE 
Model II 
RE within-
between 
Model III 
PCSE 
Constant 30.22*** 
(6.89) 
4.41 
(5.17) 
15.06** 
(5.46) 
Traditional left vote (E-1) 0.43*** 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.77*** 
(0.07) 
Δ Unemployment rate (legislative 
cycle) 
0.93*** 
(0.25) 
0.97*** 
(0.23) 
0.90*** 
(0.24) 
ENEP -1.29** 
(0.45) 
-1.53** 
(0.53) 
-0.80** 
(0.26) 
Turnout -0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.18 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
Time between elections -0.64 
(0.48) 
-0.14 
(0.45) 
-0.93 
(0.51) 
Left incumbency share -0.14 
(1.33) 
0.79 
(1.23) 
-1.19 
(1.52) 
Left incumbency share* Δ 
Unemployment rate 
-1.37** 
(0.45) 
-1.46*** 
(0.41) 
-1.31** 
(0.42) 
Traditional left vote (E-1) mean  0.93*** 
(0.07) 
 
Δ Unemployment rate mean  -0.32 
(0.93) 
 
ENEP mean  -0.22 
(0.30) 
 
Turnout mean  -0.01 
(0.04) 
 
Time between elections mean  -0.24 
(0.83) 
 
Left incumbency share mean  -0.17 
(2.93) 
 
Left incumbency share* Δ 
Unemployment rate mean 
 -0.18 
(0.95) 
 
N countries 21 21 21 
N elections 149 149 149 
R²   0.71 
σ² level 1 26.82 
(4.71) 
21.10 
(2.44) 
 
σ² level 2  16.40 
(17.15) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Significance levels * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). First and second model estimated through 
xtmixed and third model through xtpsce in Stata. First order autocorrelation specified for PCSE model.  
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TABLE 5. Differences Models as Robustness Checks 
 Model I 
First Differences 
FE 
DV: Δ Left vote 
Model II 
Arellano-Bond 
Differences 
GMM 
Model III 
System GMM 
Constant 7.91* 
(3.69) 
85.95** 
(29.55) 
39.19** 
(13.64) 
Traditional left vote (E-1) -0.32 
(0.26) 
0.07 
(0.18) 
0.40** 
(0.12) 
Traditional left vote (E-2)  -0.04 
(0.10) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
Δ Unemployment rate (legislative 
cycle) 
1.04** 
(0.26) 
1.18*** 
(0.25) 
1.34*** 
(0.27) 
ENEP -032 
(0.26) 
-1.82 
(1.00) 
-1.79 
(0.94) 
ENEP (E-1)  -0.23 
(0.88) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
ENEP (E-2)  -0.89 
(0.90) 
-1.04 
(0.80) 
Turnout -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.29 
(0.18) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
Turnout (E-1)  0.12 
(0.18) 
0.36* 
(0.17) 
Turnout (E-2)  -0.17 
(0.17) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
Time between elections -0.75* 
(0.31) 
-0.32 
(0.64) 
-0.64 
(0.61) 
Left incumbency share -3.99** 
(1.08) 
-1.81 
(1.65) 
-2.21 
(1.55) 
Left incumbency share* Δ 
Unemployment rate 
-1.60* 
(0.35) 
-2.10*** 
(0.45) 
-2.14*** 
(0.49) 
Election dummies  Included Included 
N countries 21 20 21 
N elections 149 95 116 
R² within    
R² between    
R² overall 0.18   
Rho    
Instruments  49 58 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.098 0.262 
Arellano Bond test AR2 (p-value)  0.061 0.045 
Significance levels * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-tailed test). Model I is an OLS run in stata with cluster 
robust standard errors (for 21 country-clusters). Second model estimated trough xtabond and third model through 
xtdpdsys in Stata. 
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FIGURE 1. Histogram of dependent variable: Left vote share 
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FIGURE 2 (a, b,c). Marginal effect of unemployment rate change on left vote share when 
governing majority is 0%, 50% and 100% left respectively 
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